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Failing to Score: Clinton v. Jones and
Claims of Presidential Immunity
In Clinton u. Jones,1 the United States Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not afford the President temporary immunity from
civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred prior to his
taking office absent the most unusual circumstances. 2
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Paula Corbin Jones was employed by the Arkansas Industrial
Development Commission during the time that William Jefferson
Clinton served as Governor of the State of Arkansas. Jones claimed that
on the afternoon of May 8, 1991, while she was staffing the registration
desk at an official conference in Little Rock, Arkansas--in fulfillment of
her duties as a state employee--she was summoned by Arkansas State
Police officer, Danny Ferguson, to visit Governor Clinton in a business
suite at the hotel. According to Jones, Governor Clinton made sexual
advances towards her in the business suite, which she vehemently
rejected. Jones further claimed that after she rejected Clinton's
advances she was punished by her superiors at work, who dealt with her
in a rude manner and changed her job responsibilities. Additionally,
Jones alleged that once Clinton became President of the United States,
Ferguson defamed her by suggesting to a reporter that she accepted
Clinton's alleged advances. Finally, Jones claimed that she was defamed
by various persons authorized to speak for President Clinton, who denied
that the incident ever occurred and branded her a liar.3
On May 6, 1994, Jones filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, naming Clinton and
Ferguson as defendants." The complaint contained four counts: (1) that
Clinton, acting under the color of state law, deprived her of her
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process under the Fifth

1.
2.
3.
4.

117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
Id. at 1650.
Id. at 1639-40.
Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
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and Fourteenth Amendments;5 (2) that Ferguson and Clinton conspired
to violate her federal rights; (3) that Ferguson and Clinton intentionally
inflicted emotional distress; and (4) that Ferguson, and Clinton, through
his agents, publicly defamed her.' In response to the complaint, Clinton
advised the district court that he would file a motion to dismiss on
grounds of Presidential immunity. He also requested that all other
pleadings and motions be deferred pending resolution of the immunity
issue! The district court granted Clinton's request for deferment.8
Clinton then filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and a motion to
toll the applicable statutes of limitation until his Presidency ended."
The district court denied the motion for dismissal on immunity grounds
and ruled that discovery could go forward, but ordered the trial stayed
until the end of petitioner's Presidency. 0 Both parties appealed the
district court's decision."
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial of Clinton's motion to dismiss and reversed the district court's
order staying the trial. 2 Clinton filed a petition for certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court based on the assertion that the Eighth
Circuit's decision posed a serious risk to the role of the Presidency. 3
The Supreme Court, recognizing the importance of resolving the
immunity issue, granted certiorari.14 The Supreme Court ultimately
affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit 5 and held that the President is not constitutionally entitled, except in the most exceptional
circumstances, to absolute or temporary immunity from civil damages
actions arising out of events that occurred before he took office.'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance of
providing government officials with some form of immunity from civil
damages suits. 7 The immunity doctrine, rooted in English common
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U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV.
858 F. Supp. at 904.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 692 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
Id. at 699-700.
Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1363.
117 S. Ct. at 1642.
Ii
Id. at 1652.
Id. at 1644.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744 (1982).
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law, was originally applied to judges to protect them from civil suit or
indictment based upon acts or omissions committed in fulfillment of
their judicial duties."8 English common law immunity was founded on
the principle that it is in the public's best interest to "'secure the
independence of the judges, and prevent them from being harassed by
vexatious actions.'"' 9 This immunity was "'not for the protection or
benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge,'" the Court noted at the end of
the last century, "'but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence, and without fear of consequences.' ° In its genesis,
official immunity rested on two rationales: (1) the injustice of holding
an officer, required by legal obligation to exercise discretion, liable for
his good faith efforts to exercise that discretion; and (2) the danger that
the threat of liability would discourage an officer from exercising the
discretion necessary to his office. 2 '
Early American jurisprudence expanded the common law concept of
In Spalding v.
immunity to cover public officials more generally.'
Vilas, 2 the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster
General in a civil suit stemming from an official act." The Court held
that the allegedly tortious action taken by the Postmaster General was
authorized by law and within the scope of his official duties; therefore,
he was entitled to immunity despite plaintiff's contention that he acted
with malice. 25 Defendant's motive, the Court held, was "wholly
immaterial" because the action was within his official discretion.2' The
Court emphasized the public policy reasons for executive immunity,
stating that "[tihe interests of the people require that due protection be
accorded to [public officers] in respect of their official acts.' 7
After Spalding, the Court extended the immunity defense to actions
outside the common law." In Tenney v. Brandhove,2 the Court held
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Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1896).
Id. at 494-95 (quoting Fray v. Blackburn, 3 B. & S. 576 (Q.B. 1862)).
Id. at 495 (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L.R. Ev. 220 (1868)).
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
Nixon, 457 U.S. at 744.
161 U.S. 483 (1896).
1& at 493.
Id. at 498-99.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 498.
Nixon, 457 U.S. at 745.
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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that the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 198380 did not abrogate the immunity
privilege afforded to state legislators at common law for "acts done
Sixteen years later, in
within the sphere of legislative activity."
Pierson v. Ray,' the Court reaffirmed the policy of absolute immunity
of a judge acting within the judicial role and held that a state judge was
immune from a Section 1983 suit.' Unwilling to provide a "blanket
immunity" to all government officials from Section 1983 suits, the Court
developed a concept of qualified immunity for some public officials. 4
This concept recognizes that government officials' immunity from suits
alleging constitutional violations should be limited to situations in which
the exercise of discretion was in good faith. 8
The Court in Barr v. MatteoN' held that the absolute common law
immunity that was extended to the Postmaster General in Spalding
could not be restricted to apply only to executive officers of cabinet
rank.37 In Barr, the Court held that the federal Director of the Office
of Rent Stabilization was entitled to an absolute immunity defense in an
action for libel based on information published at his discretion."8 The
Court determined that the scope of petitioner's absolute immunity
reached the outer limits of his discretionary duty.39 Thus, despite
respondent's contention that Barr acted with malice, the privilege
applied because Barr's decision to publish the allegedly libelous material
was "within the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty."40
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,4 the Court extended qualified immunity to
state executive officials accused of violating constitutional rights. The
Court in Scheuer recognized a qualified immunity available to all
executive branch officials for constitutional violations and noted that the
degree of immunity depended on the "scope of discretion" the officer was
required to exercise when taken in light of the "responsibilities of the
office" and "all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the
time of the action on which liability is sought to be based."42 Although

30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The Court cited 8 U.S.C. §§ 43 and 47(3), which were
transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994) respectively. 341 U.S. at 369.
31. 341 U.S. at 376.
32. 386 U.S. 547'(1967).
33. Id. at 553-55.
34. Id. at 555-58.
35. See id.
36. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
37. Id. at 572.
38. Id. at 574-75.
39. Id. at 575.
40. Id.
41. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
42. Id. at 247.
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qualified immunity was the general rule for executive officials accused
of constitutional violations, the Court recognized that absolute immunity
should be afforded to some executive officials "whose special functions
require a full exemption from liability."' Thus, the Court began its
move toward a functional approach to the concept of immunity.
Although expanding immunity generally, the Court rejected an
argument that all high ranking federal officials have a right to absolute
immunity from constitutional damages actions." In Butz v. Economou,"4 the Court held that federal officials have the same qualified
immunity as state officials in Section 1983 cases.' However, the Court
stated that' "there are some officials whose special functions require a
full exemption from liability."47
Nixon v. Fitzgerald' was the first case to present the claim that the
President of the United States possesses absolute immunity from civil
damages liability.49 In Nixon, respondent asserted two statutory
actions under federal laws of general applicability and one constitutional
Respondent argued that the President, like other federal
claim.'
executive officials, is entitled only to qualified immunity for alleged
constitutional violations. The Court rejected this argument, noting that
the President's "unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him
from other executive officials."5 The Court also rejected respondents
contention that Nixon, by allegedly ordering the discharge of an
employee of the Department of the Air Force, was acting outside the
"outer perimeter of his duties.' Because Nixon had the constitutional
and statutory authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in
force for the Air Force, the alleged wrongful act was considered to be
within the outer perimeter of his duties as President." The Court,
purporting to apply a functional approach, reasoned that the unique
nature of the President's constitutional functions called for absolute

43. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).

44. See id.
45.

438 U.S. 478 (1978).

46. Id. at 506-07.
47. Id. at 508.
48. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
49. Id. at 748.
50. Id Respondent argued that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to
Congress and that the dismissal violated 5 U.SC. § 7211, 18 U.S.C. § 1505, and the First
Amendment. 457 U.S. at 756.
51. 457 U.S. at 750.
52. Id. at 756.
53. Id. at 757.
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immunity from civil damages liability for acts within the "outer
perimeter" of his official duties."
It is important to note that the Supreme Court was sharply divided in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald.' Dissenting Justices White, Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall were disturbed by the fact that the plurality's outerperimeter immunity would "extend even to actions taken with express
knowledge that the conduct was clearly contrary to the controlling
statute or clearly violative of the Constitution."
Such a broad
immunity, they reasoned, was actually contrary to the Court's new
functional approach to the separation of powers doctrine.5 7 They would
have held that Presidential immunity attaches only to particular
functions of the President, rather than to the position in general."
Additionally, Justice Blackmun"' argued that the plurality's contention
that "the absolute immunity of the President is compelled by separationof-powers concerns" was incompatible with the idea that the President
is "hully subject to congressionally created forms of liability."'
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Nixon, emphasized the Constitutional foundation for absolute Presidential immunity.' While Justice
Burger agreed that a President should not be immune for acts not within
official duties, he also recognized that the need to defend damages suits
"would have the serious effect of diverting the attention of a President
from his executive duties since defending a lawsuit today--even a
lawsuit ultimately found to be frivolous--often requires significant
expenditures of time and money.
Absolute immunity, he argued, is
"not simply a doctrine derived from [the Supreme Court's] interpretation
of common law or public policy." Instead, it flows from the "essential
purpose of the separation of powers" which allows for the "independent
functioning of each coequal branch of government within its assigned
sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or
intimidation by other branches.""

54. Id. at 756.
55. Id. at 764 (White, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. I& at 785.
58. Id. at 764.
59. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall. Id at 797 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote a separate dissent,
which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 764 (White, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 798 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 760 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 763.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 760-61.
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After Nixon, the Court left the lofty heights of presidential immunity.
However, it confirmed the pervasiveness of its functional approach to
immunity questions in Forresterv. White." The question presented in
Forrester was whether a state court judge was entitled to absolute
immunity from a Section 1983 suit based on his dismissal of a female
probation officer." The Court, despite its recognition of the historically
"sweeping form" of judicial immunity, as compared to the qualified
immunity possessed by the highest level executive officials,6 7 held that
the judge's decisions were not judicial acts triggering absolute immunity." Administrative acts undertaken by a judge do not constitute
judicial acts requiring absolute immunity, reasoned the Court.69
Therefore, under a functional approach, the judge was not entitled to
absolute immunity for his nonjudicial acts. 70 The Court pointed out
that it has been "quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute
official immunity."71 Absolute immunity, stated the Court, is "'strong
medicine, justified only when the danger of [officials being hampered in
the effective performance of their duties] is very great."'7
While
recognizing that the President of the United States is entitled to
absolute immunity from damages liability based on his official acts, the
Court emphasized that such immunity is based
on the President's
73
"'nique position in the constitutional scheme.'"

III. CouRT's RATIONALE
The Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones began its analysis by
identifying two constitutional issues that it declined to address to avoid
premature adjudication of constitutional questions. 74 First, the Court
noted that it was not necessary to consider whether the immunity claim
might succeed in a state court because the immunity claim was asserted
in a federal court and was based largely on the doctrine of separation of
powers.76 Second, the Court stated that it need not address whether

65. 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
66. Id at 220-21.

67. Id. at 225.
68.

Id. at 221.

69. Id. at 230.
70. Id.
71.
72.

1d. at 224.
Id. at 230 (quoting White v. Forrester, 792 F.2d 647, 660 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,

J., dissenting)).
73. Id. at 225 (quoting Nixon, 457 U.S. 731 at 749).
74.

117 S. Ct. at 1642.

75. Id.
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a court may compel the President's attendance at a specific time and
place.76 The Court addressed petitioner's primary contention that the
Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil suits
based on events that occurred prior to his taking office.77 The Court's
review of previous claims against sitting Presidents revealed that three
former Presidents had been defendants in civil suits based on actions
that occurred prior to taking office.' However, none of those cases was
disposed of via Presidential immunity.79 The Court identified what it
saw to be the "principal rationale" behind the immunity doctrine: serving
the public interest by allowing public officials to perform their duties
effectively without fear of personal liability.' The Court stated that in
Nixon (which held that a former President was entitled to absolute
immunity from civil damages suits stemming from his official acts) its
"central concern" was that the President not be overly cautious in
performing his duties."' This concern did not support immunity for
unofficial acts. 2 The Court pointed out that even in defining the scope
of immunity for official acts, it has taken a functional approach,
determining immunity based on an official's actions rather than his
office.' Therefore, petitioner's argument for absolute immunity for a
President's unofficial acts "grounded purely in the identity of his office"
was rejected."' The Court also rejected petitioner's arguments for
absolute immunity based on the historical record, because it found more
historical
support for its functional approach to presidential immuni85
ty.
Finally, the Court addressed petitioner's "strongest argument
supporting his immunity claim," that judicial proceedings against him
should be stayed based on separation of powers principles." Because
it found that litigation relating to the unofficial conduct of the President

76. Id. at 1643.
77. Id
78. Id. Complaints against Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman were dismissed
before they took office and the dismissals were affirmed while they were in office. A suit
against John F. Kennedy arising out of an automobile accident was settled out of court.
Id.
79. President Kennedy unsuccessfully argued that as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces he was entitled to a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940, but the matter was settled after the motion for a stay was denied. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1644.
82. Id.
83. Id
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1645.
86. Id. at 1645-46.
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"poses no perceptible risk of misallocation of either judicial or executive
power," the Court found no separation of powers violation because there
was no attempted aggrandizement by the judicial branch respecting a
President's governmental activities.8 7 In rejecting petitioner's contention that proceeding with the trial during his Presidency would
impermissibly burden him in the performance of his constitutional
duties, the Court held that not all interactions between the Judicial and
Executive Branches, even quite burdensome ones, present separation of
powers problems." The Court pointed to the fact that it has the
authority to review official actions of the President to ensure their
constitutionality9 and that the President is subject to judicial process
in certain circumstances. The Court repeated its statement in Nixon,
that "'neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain
an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial
Most importantly, the Court
process under all circumstances.'"9
reasoned that "[tihe burden on the President's time and energy that is
a mere by-product" of the judicial branch's review of the chief executive's
unofficial conduct "surely cannot be considered as onerous as the direct
burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional invalidation of his
official actions.9 2 The Court, in holding that the doctrine of separation
of powers "does not require federal courts to stay all private actions
against the President until he leaves office,9 3 refused to create a
"categorical rule" to that effect, noting that it is "more appropriately
[within] ... judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution" whether an action should be deemed a "most exceptional case" for
purposes of granting a stay.94
Although the Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit's determination
that a stay was not constitutionally mandated, it did not agree that the
district court's order to stay the trial after completion of discovery was
the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity.95

87. Id. at 1648.
88. Id

89. Id. at 1649 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
90. Id. (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692D) and
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
91. Id. (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706). In Nixon, the Court held that President Nixon
was obligated to comply with a subpoena commanding him to produce certain evidence.
Id. (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706).
92. Id. at 1650.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Instead, the Court held that it was within the district court's discretion
to stay the trial or the discovery process based on the federal courts'
power to control their own dockets." According to the Court, the "high
respect" owed to the Presidential office should be a factor in the district
court's treatment of the entire proceeding, "including the timing and
scope of discovery"9
However, despite the discretion the Court
accorded the district court, it found that the district court abused its
discretion by deciding prematurely to stay the trial when there "was no
way to assess whether a stay of trial after the completion of discovery
would be warranted. 8
Justice Breyer concurred with the Court's refusal to create a rule of
categorical immunity for the President from civil suits based on
unofficial conduct." He also concurred with the Court's conclusion that
separation of powers principles do not mandate a stay of all private
actions against the President."° However, Justice Breyer disagreed
with what he characterized as the Court's "disregard" for the separation
of powers principle forbidding a federal judge from interfering with "the
President's discharge of his public duties." 1 Further, Justice Breyer
argued that the Court de-emphasized the extent that safeguards against
excessive burdening of the Executive Branch by the Judicial Branch
support the President's independence to control his own time and energy.
Justice Breyer expressed concern that disregarding such safeguards
appears to deny them. 2 Thus, his fear was that the Court, by deemphasizing the constitutional principle of protecting the Executive
Branch from excessive burdening, risked extinguishing a "practically
° While Breyer saw no support for
necessary institutional safeguard."'O
"automatic temporary immunity," he did find constitutional support for
a principle of "judicial noninterference with Presidential functions in
ordinary civil damages actions."'0 '
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer
agreed that the President bears the burden of establishing the need for
a postponement of civil proceedings.0 5

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1650-51.
98. Id. at 1651.
99. Id. at 1652 (Breyer, J., concurring).

100. Id.
101. 1d

102. Id.
103. Id. at 1653.
104. Id. Justice Breyer believes that this principle ofjudicial noninterference is found

in the Constitution's "text, history, and precedent." Id.
105. Id. at 1652.
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IMPLICATIONS

In what appears to be an attempt to balance the concerns echoed by
the dissenters in Nixon-that broad immunity essentially gives the
President a license to knowingly violate the Constitution or federal
statutes-with separation of powers concerns of judicial overburdening
of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Court may have overlooked more
serious separation of powers problems. Refusing to create a categorical
rule of temporary immunity from civil suit on one hand, while on the
other hand, recognizing that excessive impairment of the Executive
Branch by the Judicial Branch would be constitutionally impermissible,
the Court left it to the district courts to determine "extraordinary
circumstances."" The Court specifically stated that a stay of trial or
discovery could be justified by considerations "that do not require the
recognition of any constitutional immunity.""° According to the Court,
the "high respect... owed to the office of the Chief Executive," should
"inform the conduct of the entire proceeding."'
Such a result would appear to impermissibly subject the Executive
Branch, which as Judge Wright stated is "in effect... only one person,
the President,"1°9 to the risk of "control, interference, or intimidation"
by the Judicial Branch.' 0 In light of Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Nixon, this defies "[tihe essential purpose of the separation of
powers."'
The fact that the district court's determination of extraordinary circumstances is subjected to abuse of discretion review does not
alleviate this concern.
Most likely, the Court, recognizing that "a trial may consume some of
the President's time and attention"" nevertheless underestimated the
burden on the President's time and energy in defending civil actions.
Again, Chief Justice Burger forewarned of these burdens when he
recognized that defending a lawsuit in the modern era, even one which
is ultimately deemed frivolous, requires "significant expenditures of time
and money.""' Finally, the Court's suggestion that the district court
gave "undue weight to the concern that a trial might generate unrelated
civil actions that could conceivably hamper the President in conducting

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1650.
Id
Id. at 1650-51.
Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 695.
Nixon, 457 U.S. at 761 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 760-61.
117 S. Ct. at 1651.
457 U.S. at 763 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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the duties of his office"114 appears ironic in light of the most recent
allegations against President Clinton and the expanded investigation by
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr that grew out of the Jones
litigation.
In conclusion, the potential separation of powers concerns implicated
by allowing the district courts to determine whether extraordinary
circumstances exist to mandate a stay of discovery or trial, should not
be ignored. As Justice Scalia observed in his dissent in Morrison v.
Olson: "Frequently an issue of [allocation of power between the three
branches] will come before the Court clad ... in sheep's clothing: the
potential of the asserted principle to effect important change in the
equilibrium of power is not immediately evident, and must be discerned
by a careful and perceptive analysis."" Justice Scalia argued that the
power issue in Morrison was so blatant that it did not come in sheep's
The district courts' newly recogclothing, but rather "as a wolf."
nized power to decide whether a trial or discovery will proceed against
the President during office based on a determination of extraordinary
circumstances appears to have the potential to affect the equilibrium of
power between the three branches. In fact, just as Justice Scalia
characterized the alleged usurpation of power in Morrison, this may
have come as a wolf."7
JENNIFER MOTOS

114.
115.
116.
117.

117 S. Ct. at 1651.
487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.

